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a b s t r a c t
Recently the importance of addressing values in discussions of risk perception and adapta-
tion to climate change has become manifest. Values-based approaches to climate change
adaptation and the cultural cognition thesis both illustrate this trend. We argue that in the
wake of this development it is necessary to take the dynamic relationship between values
and beliefs seriously, to acknowledge the possibility of bi-directional relationships between
values and beliefs, and to address the variety of values involved (e.g. personal, epistemic and
cultural values). The dynamic relationship between values and beliefs, we claim, highlights
the need to bring ethical considerations to bear on climate change communication. In
particular, we must ask whether it is acceptable to tailor information about the risks of
climate change in an effort to maximize communicative effectiveness given the values of
the target group.
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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsciThe need to talk explicitly about values in any serious study of
risk perception and human adaptation to climate change has
come into focus of late. This is most welcome, but we believe
that two prominent recent contributions to the discussion
underappreciate the significance of the dynamic relationship
between values and climate change adaptation (Kahan et al.,
2012; Adger et al., 2013). The novelty of these contributions lies
in the clarity with which they insist that cultural perspectives
affect the uptake of scientific evidence on climate change. But
although this is important, it does not go far enough, and it is
vital that we do not neglect other aspects of the complex
belief-value dynamic involved. In this dynamic values other
than cultural ones exert influence. The processes at play are* Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 0462220924.
E-mail address: Johannes.persson@fil.lu.se (J. Persson).
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1462-9011/# 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is 
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).also very probably bi-directional, with new evidence affecting
valuations. This raises an ethical question about climate
science communications: Should these be limited by the fear
of threatening the values of one or another group if we know
that values are both diverse and shaped to an extent by
scientific information?
1. Value-based approaches to climate change
adaptation
The ‘‘values-based’’ approach (O’Brien and Wolf, 2010) notes
that the values we bring to climate change vary acrossan open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 5 2 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 – 52societies and cultures, and infers that the variation is vital to
proper explanation of the human response to environmental
risk.1 Adger et al. (2013, 113) agree:
Cultural perspectives help to explain differences in
responses across populations to the same environmental
risks. Recent research shows that information about
climate change does not connect with all cultures and
worldviews in the same way. Douglas and Wildavsky argue
that societies with shared values and beliefs produce their
own selective view of the natural environment, which
influences how they interpret and respond to risk.
This sounds sensible – unexceptional, even. In fact,
however, the notion that populations respond differently to
the same risks is highly problematic. ‘‘Same’’ in what sense?
The same probabilities? ‘‘Probabilities’’ in what sense?
Personal subjective probabilities? Frequencies? Objective
(physical) probabilities? And who says that the outcome is
undesired? Whose values must be respected?
Sensitivity to cultural perspectives enables us to identify
the events and activities that populations perceive as risky
(always remembering that risk is a function of uncertainty and
values). Culturally sensitive risk analysis has been particularly
important as antidote to the economist’s sometimes exclusive
focus on economic and material values. In the present context
it delivers ‘‘a deeper understanding of what climate change
means for society’’ (O’Brien and Wolf, 2010, 239). Climate
change means different things to different individuals and
groups already simply because we value things differently.
The Norwegian notion of friluftsliv (i.e. open-air living), for
instance, is arguably a distinctive value that has to be
acknowledged if we are to understand attitudes to climate
change in Norway (O’Brien, 2009, 172).
Important as this insight is – and for practical purposes it is
often crucial – expressed in the way it is above it is old news,
theoretically speaking. Belief and preference, or valuation, are
the key inputs in the received model of both decision-making
and risk-analysis. Preferences and valuations are similar in
kind to the ‘‘broader and subjective interpretation of values’’
these authors advocate.2 No one should be surprised that such
values are important in risk and adaptation. The fact that it is
old news from a theoretical standpoint does not, in itself,
render the insight unimportant. Climate policy will be at least
as important as climate science in any effort to secure the
future of our planet.
What would be surprising from the decision-making
perspective is a value-based approach recognizing only
societal or cultural values. It seems to be a mistake to argue
that it is only values of these kinds (in the absence of personal1 The conception of values assumed here does not entail that
values can be expressed as monetary worth. Instead, values relate
‘‘to principles or qualities that are intrinsically desirable.’’ (O’Brien
and Wolf, 2010, 232). O’Brien and Wolf refer to this conception as a
‘‘broader and subjective interpretation of values’’ (ibid.). In general
we agree with this interpretation, but we prefer to refer to these
broader and subjective ‘‘values’’ as preferences or valuations.
2 Belief, conceived in this way, concerns the probability dimen-
sion of the decision or the risk-analysis, and preference or valua-
tion belongs to the evaluative dimension.preferences and desires) that have a role to play in explaining
how humans respond to climate change risks, and we would
like to point out that Adger and colleagues do not claim this
(for instance, Adger et al. (2013, 112) say that ‘‘material
aspects’’ of climate change are conventionally included in
policy analysis).
To hold otherwise would be to follow those social scientists
(e.g. Bradbury, 1989) who have assumed that risk is either a
physical attribute (Starr, 1969) or socially/culturally constructed
(Wynne, 1980; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983). We observe that
risk can also be conceived as subjective – determined by beliefs
and desires (Ramsey, 1990; Savage, 1954), perceived – fixed by
contextual and personal factors (Slovic, 1999), felt – when it is
conceived as risk-as-feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001), or
epistemic – governed by what we think we know when we are
acting (Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin, 1983; Sahlin and Persson, 1994).
We will not go into details here, but see for example Blennow
et al. (2014) for a detailed exposition and critique of the
minimalist perspectives in which risk is regarded as either
physical or social (see also Slovic (1998) for a related position).
A preoccupation with society or culture in the analysis of
values, risk and adaptation appears, therefore, to be an
artefact of the researcher’s own interest, not an accurate
delineation of the kinds of value that can exert influence on a
decision-maker. Any value-based perspective needs to ac-
knowledge value plurality. How these plural values relate is of
course an intricate question. We simply note that to answer
this question we need a framework broader than a merely
cultural one.
2. Cultural perspectives and evidence-
formation
There is a more interesting reading of Adger et al. (2013). To
begin with they talk about cultural perspectives. Such
perspectives include cultural values, but also what we call
cultural beliefs. This inclusion should be straightforward in
the context at hand; culture is defined by Adger et al. (2013,
112) as the symbols that create meaning, including beliefs,
rituals, art and stories that create collective outlooks and
behaviours. Crudely speaking, this opens up two ways in
which cultural perspectives can influence risk perception and
decision-making: via values or via beliefs. The authors also
state, however, that cultural perspectives may ‘‘connect’’ with
scientific information and knowledge in different ways. This
may refer to the straightforward connection we mentioned
above, with information deriving from one source and values
from another. But the connection might be more complex, as
one source may influence the other. Hence we interpret the
two ideas here to be:
(1) Cultural perspectives consist of beliefs and values that
affect environmental decision-making.
(2) Cultural perspectives influence the uptake of (scientific)
evidence.
So far we have talked about (1). We have argued that (1)
needs to be expanded since things other than cultural
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ing. But even an expanded version of (1) is rather trivial, and
perhaps harmless, without (2).
Idea (2) emphasizes the belief-value dynamic. Thus, for
instance, the way in which we update our beliefs depends on
what we already believe and prefer. Equally, doxastic updates
might change our narratives and cultural values. We cannot
fully explain how scientific communication affects climate
change adaptation without understanding this dynamic. That
Adger et al. (2013, 113) intend this interpretation of their claim
becomes evident when they continue:
Climate change narratives often interact with other beliefs
to motivate responses, which in some cases may not be
consistent with the ‘rational’ responses advocated by
institutions promoting adaptation. For example, people
in atoll islands in the South Pacific merge scientific
information about climate change with pre-existing nar-
ratives about cultural decline in ways that discourage
adaptation.
To substantiate (2), and thus be in a position to explain how
cultural (and other) beliefs and values interact with the uptake
of scientific (and other new) evidence, it is necessary to
analyse the various pathways of interaction. We wish to draw
attention to the following three possibilities:
First, belief–belief flux. There may be interaction between
scientific evidence and cultural beliefs. This is the interaction
not of values and beliefs, but of beliefs acquired at different
times. We need to know through what mechanisms new
scientific knowledge is being taken up given already present
cultural beliefs. What is known as confirmation bias, which
arises when people tend to search for, or interpret, informa-
tion in a way that confirms their preconceptions (Bacon (1620/
2000); for a more recent review, Nickerson (1998)), is a well-
known mechanism here. Similar mechanisms are sometimes
said to operate on more aggregated levels. Kuhn’s idea of a
paradigm is often overstated, but it clearly has an application
in some cases where a well-developed structure of principles
and ideal examples is established in a community. Kupper-
man (1982) reports that English settlers who arrived in North
America in the early colonial period believed that climate was
a function of latitude. Newfoundland, which is south of
London, was expected to have a moderate climate. Despite
their experience of far colder temperatures and crop failures,
the colonists clung to their latitude-based expectations
(Weber, 2010, 333) Further examples could readily be devel-
oped. However, we need to know whether these mechanisms
are applicable, and if so to what extent when it comes to
scientific evidence and cultural beliefs about climate change
and related matters.
Second, value–belief dynamics. New scientific evidence might
be incompatible with certain cultural beliefs, and these beliefs
might be providing support for certain cultural values. I may
be in favour of friluftsliv because I think it is good for my
physical and mental health to spend time in the wilderness,
and also that such living fosters environment-friendly
conduct. Novel scientific findings might counter-evidence
these beliefs and thus jeopardize friluftsliv as a cultural value.
Existing values, then, can be threatened when cultural beliefsare modified in light of new scientific knowledge – although it
is also true that the prospect of this may give rise to a value
bias favouring refusal to take up the new scientific evidence.
This value–belief dynamic can be channelled in at least two
ways. It can run directly from values to beliefs, as when the
value I have inhibits me from dropping a particular belief
about its beneficial consequences. This is the kind of dynamics
we are primarily interested in.
But the influence can also be indirect: it may disqualify
certain evidence-forming procedures by which the new
scientific evidence has been generated. My own array of
cultural values might be exactly what stops me from exploring
certain kinds of situation, with the result that these very
values will not be challenged. My ethical views can tell against
certain kinds of experiment; and the absence of the potential
findings of that experiment, or of the evidence it would
provide, might sometimes be precisely what is upholding
these values. Naturally such an influence could also be
positive: a particular set of cultural values could encourage
me to undertake relevant exploration and belief revision.
Third, and presumably most importantly, since measures
to adapt (and indeed adaptation and maladaptation them-
selves) might affect the things we value, our acceptance of
scientific evidence as a basis for action takes place as we keep
an eye on its effects on the things we value. This might give
rise to the following interaction between cultural values and
scientific evidence-formation.
Let us assume that A is something we (and the culture to
which we belong) value, such as winter sports. Let us also
assume that new scientific knowledge suggests A is at risk
(global warming). Clearly this piece of scientific evidence may
have an effect on us. The fact that we value A is not immaterial
when it comes to the question whether we are likely to take up
the new scientific evidence. However, the outcome might be
indeterminate. On the one hand, there should be a value bias in
favour of not taking up the new evidence, since this refusal will
reduce the perceived risk (and thus prevent the current winter
holiday from being spoiled by worries about future such
holidays). On the other hand, there should be a value bias in
favour of taking the evidence up, since it identifies a potential
threat to A (we have to do something now, or else our children
might not have the opportunity to go cross-country skiing!). It is
clear that, to the extent that risk is about knowledge too, we
have reason to recognize the threat as a serious possibility even
though it might not be the most likely scenario (Ga¨rdenfors and
Sahlin 1982; Sahlin and Persson, 1994).
3. The cultural cognition thesis
An intriguing finding has recently been reported (Kahan et al.,
2012, 732):
Members of the public with the highest degrees of science
literacy and technical reasoning capacity were not the most
concerned about climate change. Rather, they were the
ones among whom cultural polarization was greatest.
This looks like bias: at any rate, let us refer to it as a ‘‘culture
bias’’. Interestingly, it appears not to fit the heuristics and
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e.g. Kahneman, 2011). Normally bias is held to result from lack
of cognitive resources; but culture bias becomes stronger with
increased resources. Dual process thinking does not appear to
be straightforwardly applicable to this phenomenon.
The finding also casts doubt on the familiar ‘‘knowledge-
deficit’’ model which says that laypeople have limited
concern about climate change issues because they are poorly
equipped with scientific information and/or the capacity for
scientific thinking. For instance, civic scientific literacy has
been conceptualized ‘‘as the level of understanding of science
. . . needed to function as citizens in a modern industrial
society’’ (Miler and Pardo 2000, 55). The knowledge-deficit
model does not account for the cultural polarization observed
among those who are scientifically literate. Nor does it
account for the fact that less educated individuals are
sometimes more concerned about risk (together with the
scientists) than those with higher levels of education (e.g. see
Slovic, 1999).
As an alternative explanation Kahan et al. (2012, 732)
formulate the ‘‘cultural cognition thesis’’ (CCT):
. . . individuals, as a result of a complex of psychological
mechanisms, tend to form perceptions of societal risks that
cohere with values characteristic of groups with which
they identify.
In itself, CCT does not explain why the risk perceptions of
scientifically literate people deviate from those of others.
Something has to be added to the thesis along the lines that
the former are better at forming coherent personal world-
views, or form stronger (more certain, more stable) ‘‘cultural’’
values and preferences. Kahan et al. (2012) appear to prefer the
first of these additions. They say: ‘‘Fitting information to
identity-defining commitments makes demands on all man-
ner of cognition’’ (2012, 734). And referring to ‘‘ordinary
citizens who are equipped and disposed to appraise informa-
tion in a reflective, analytic manner’’, they now state more
explicitly (Kahan et al., 2015) that ‘‘. . . they often become even
more culturally polarized because of the specific capacity they
have to search out and interpret evidence in patterns that
sustain the convergence between their risk perceptions and
their group identities’’.
4. Effects and ethics of science
communication
In concluding Kahan et al. (2012), the authors remark that CCT
implies that effective science communication cannot be
guaranteed simply by ensuring that the information is sound
and clear. From this follows a recommendation. We want to
point out this recommendation is not part of CCT itself, since
CCT is a descriptive claim about cultural cognition. It is what
we might call ‘‘Kahan’s recommendation’’. The recommen-
dation is that to be effective science communication should, in
certain ‘‘pathological’’ situations, steer clear of threats to any
cultural values in the offing. This may well be correct, and
indeed important in scientific comms. However, it inevitably
raises some ethical issues.As citizens understandably tend to conform their beliefs
about societal risk to beliefs that predominate among their
peers, communicators should endeavor to create a delib-
erative climate in which accepting the best available
science does not threaten any group’s values (Kahan
et al., 2012, 734).
Similar formulations occur in the most recent paper by
Kahan et al. Science communication ‘‘must avail itself of the
cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that
information will not estrange them from their communities’’
(Kahan et al., 2015). Taken to an extreme, this would mean
that in some cases the only way to avoid browbeating any
group over its values may be to misinform, deceive or lie about
the ‘‘best available science’’, simply to bluff the public into
action. We are sure that this is not what Kahan et al. have in
mind. They would no doubt respond that we should not
exaggerate the problem and insist that CCT entails merely
that in ‘‘pathological’’ situations we will need to adopt
something like Kahan’s proposed strategy in order to
effectively communicate. However, even with these provisos
Kahan’s recommendation does little to discourage contem-
plation of the need for what looks like questionable
disingenuousness.
A fundamental problem with the recommendation is that
CCT highlights just one of several potential implications of the
belief–value dynamic. CCT clearly assumes that values are
cognitively prior to beliefs. But whether or not this implies the
temporal priority of values, or that values are somehow more
entrenched than beliefs, it seems that beliefs are just as often
cognitively prior to values. It may well be that, in another
manifestation of the dynamic, new scientific evidence slowly
brings about modifications in group values. Certainly, the risks
involved in the communication strategy Kahan et al. recom-
mend might be serious enough to show that this possibility
should be scrutinized first.
Openness, prudence, reliability, trustworthiness and truth-
fulness – these are but a few of the virtues and values that
seem to clash with the communication strategy recom-
mended by Kahan et al. A tendency to rely on perceptions
of risk cohering with values shared by like-minded people will
generally lead us to become one-eyed when it comes to
evidence formation and science communication. One directs a
spotlight on evidence that does not distress one’s own group,
or the group one wishes to communicate with, and leaves
other evidence in the darkness. On this interpretation the
communication strategy recommended by Kahan et al. (2012)
becomes a firewall – a fortification made of values that
protects us from good science as much as bad. The strategy
positively encourages us to look for evidence that is too
narrow, readily available, and skewed in favour of social and
cultural values, and to translate what we hear into what we are
already seeking.
Empirical evidence indicates that today trust in research is
decreasing. There may be many reasons for this. National
audit offices are nowadays active when it comes to auditing
universities – and not just their use of resources, but also their
academic work (Sahlin, 2013). Inadequacies, weaknesses, and
uncertainties come to light through the openness and
disclosure that this accountability requires (Drenth, 2012).
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research is of course a serious problem.3
Does over-enthusiastic adoption of Kahan’s recommended
communication strategy explain, at least in part, declining
trust in research? In this short text we cannot explore this
hypothesis. However, it does not seem far-fetched to suggest
that if we conclude that values have to be respected if science
communication is to be successful, rather than championing
the hallowed scientific virtues just listed, we shall only have
ourselves to blame when distrust in science deepens.
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